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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a declaratory judgment where-
in the plaintiff seeks a determination that Chapter 206, 
La-ws of Utah, 1969, (Senate Bill 205) be declared un-
constitutional and that defenda-nts be enjoined from the 
acts contemplated by the statute. (R. 1-9) 
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DISPOSITIOX IN LO-WER COURT 
The trial court held that Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 
1969, was constitutional, and the eomplaint of plaintiff 
was dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. (R. 
73-78) 
SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff-appellant seeks reversal of the trial 
court determination, and a declaration that Chapter 206, 
Laws of Utah, 1969, is unconstitutional in whole or in 
part; defendants-respondents urge the affirmance of the 
lo·wer court decision, and a declaration that the statute 
is constitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants-respondents do not take exception 
to the statement of facts of plaintiff-appellant insofar 
as it designates and identifies the parties to this litiga-
tion, and the constitutional provisions relating to the 
office of Treasurer. Exception is taken, however, to the 
recitation of the statutory duties of the State Treasurer, 
and any inference or claim that acts in pursuance of such 
legislation have established a practice or pattern which 
bears upon the scope of the constitutional functions of 
the Treasurer. Further exception is taken to any claim 
that such legislation may be a recognition of some in-
herent or historical functions of the Treasurer. No evi-
dence was presented in this matter; the lower court de-
termination was a judgment on the pleadings; any al-
leged acts or practices of the State Treasurer under 
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statutory provisions are irrele,·ant, and in any event not 
hl•ton' the court. If the court considers sueh alleged acts 
and practices properly lwfore it for consideration it ii" 
submitted that, if m1ything, the statutory provisions in-
dieak the legislaturr has not considered the Treasurer 
to han' any inherent authority to manage, invest or de-
posit state funds, hut has enacted legislation covering the 
ARGU:\IENT 
POINT I 
CHAPTER 206, LA "\VS OF UTAH, 1969, 
DOES NOT "WITH THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DUTY OF THE TREASURER 
AS THE CUSTODIAN OF PUBLIC MON-
EYS. 
Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969, known as the 
Statr Management Act, relates to the funds of 
the State of Utah and its political subdivisions; it pro-
,·idcs for a system of centralized investment and man-
agf'ment of those funds; in furtherance of this objective it 
creates a division of im·estments, an investment council, 
an investment officer and a financial analyst within the 
division, defining their various duties; the act, inter 
alia, provides for the qualifications of a qualified de-
pository of public funds, and for the more prompt pay-
Illc'11t of state moneys. 
The plaintiff-appellant claims that Chapter 206, 
Laws of Utah, 1969, contravenes the provisions of Sec-
tion 17 of Article VII of the Constitution of Utah, which 
J n·o,·ides : 
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''The Auditor shall be Auditor of Public ..-\c-
counts, and the Tn•asurer shall ht> the eusto<lia11 
of public moneys, and each shall perform such 
other duties as may be provided by law.'' 
It is most appare11t that the only issue raised in this 
case turns on the definition of "custodian of puhlir 
moneys"; for if the State Money Management Act does 
not contravene such constitutional duty of the Treas-
urer, there cannot be a violation of the Constitution, for 
the Treasurer '' * * * shall perform such other duties 
as may be provided by law.'' 
Plaintiff-appellant cites no cases or authority de-
fini11g the phrase, ''custodian of public moneys'' or 
"custodian", but asserts without warrant that the con-
stitutional pov,rer of the State Treasurer '' * * * includes 
the function of managing, investing, reinvesting and de-
positing the monies of the State * * * ". (Appellant's 
Brief, page 9) The total absence of any authority in 
support of this proposition is significant. 
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second 
Edition defines ''custodian'' as follows: ''one who ha:; 
care or custody * * * ; a keeper.'' 
The term "custody" as applied to property is de-
fined in 25 C.J.S., Custody, p. 90, as follows: 
''The keeping of property by one who is 
charged with or assumes responsibility for its 
safety; the care and charge of property for one 
who retains the right to control it; the charge 
to keep and care for the owner, subject to his 
order and direction, without any interest or right 
therein adverse to him; such a relation toward it 
as would constitute possession if the person hav-
ing custody had it on his own account.'' 
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Set> Natio11al Fire Insurance Co. r. Dai:is, (Texas) 179 
S. -w. 2cl :n6; U.S. c. One O:r-5 Amrrican Eagle Airplane, 
:l8 JOG. 
Aconli11g to 81 C .. J.S., States, p. 1191: 
'' "' * " The legal title to public moneys in 
the hands of th<" state treasurC'r or other officer 
C'llt ! t lc<l to cu st otly thereof is in the state and not 
i11 sneh officer." 
It is apparent that custody, and the role of a cus-
todian, i:rrnlve the care and charge of property for the 
owner, always subject to the order and direction of the 
o\\·11pr. In th<> case of Territory ex rel. City of Albuquer-
q111' r. Jlatson (N. Mexico) 113 Pac. 816, the court, among 
other questions, had to decide whether under state law 
a had the right to df'signate a depository of money 
in the hands of its treasurer. The statute in question pro-
\'i< led that the treasurer "may be required to keep all 
moneys in his hands belonging to the corporation in such 
}Jl;1cf' of cll'posit as may be designated by ordinance." 
The sta tut<' tllC'n stated: "Provided, however, no such 
on linanee shall be passed by which the custody of such 
nwm·Y shall be taken from the treasurer." "\Vhether the 
foregoing statutory provisions were contradictory was 
analyzed by tllC' court as follows: 
"It should be borne in mind that the money 
is all the time the property of the city and not of 
the treasurer; that his duty is to recein it for 
the city and with it pay claims against th1> city 
\\·hich have been duly approved. Plse 
is, or should be, subsidiary to this main ohject. 
I11 that connection, the word "custody" must 
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mean immediate cliarge awl eontrol uwler the 
law, and not thr final ab1->olutr eontrol of ow11Pr-
ship. Suppose a pen;on to be earrying on a l1usi-
ness through a manager, nrnl tliat he clir0ds him 
to deposit all the money he reeeins in a eertaill 
bank in his own name as manager, and subjf·d 
only to his rherks a8 manager, could it he said 
with any show of reason that the money is not 
in his custody because lie did not select the hank 
of deposit? And is a prisoner any less in the· 
custody of the jailer because he holds him in a 
jail provided by the county and designated Jn-
law as the place of confinement for such a 
er? If by the ordinance in question the city had, 
for instance, required the treasurer to deposit in 
the joint names of himself and some other officer 
of the city, and that payments from the deposit 
should be made only by checks signed by both 
such depositors, that obviously would have been 
calculated to deprive him of the custody of the 
money. But the mere designation of the bank in 
which he shall deposit, in his own name, and sub-
ject only to his own checks, as treasurer, without 
in the least restricting his right to pay out the 
money acording to law, is not depriving him of 
the custody of the money.'' 
This court has recognized and upheld the right of 
the Utah State Land Board to make investment of cer-
tain state funds. S('e State Ho!lrd of La11rl Commissio11ers 
L Ririe, 56 Utah 213, 190 Pac. 59; State Land Boarr1 r. 
State Finance Commission, 12 Utah 2d 263, 365 P.2d 21:3. 
The result8 of these decisions are in accord with the ar-
gument advanced herein by clefenclants-respondents, hut 
are contrary to that adYocated by the Treasurer. 
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It is suhrnitt<•<l that th<_1 position of thP <ldenclanb-
i ,·,_;po!ld('llts a11Pnt thL1 ('Ollstitntional <lntirs of tlw Tn•as-
111'('1' is a'so i11 aeconl with l('gislation e11acte<l n'"ardi11g . ,... 
1 ht· deposit, i m·rst me11t, a 11< l managPnwnt of pu hlic 
111•1JJ<'ys. I11 this rl'Rprct S('(' Sectio11s :ll-5-1 to :ll-5-13, 
L« .. \. as amended (Fnrnls Consolidation Aet); 
:-;('l·tions t't St'q., P.C.A. as amPnded (im·est-
i:w11ts the Director of Sedion G3-1-G3, r.c . 
. \. linnstments by Utah State Lan!l Board); Sec-
t im1s ;Jl-1-1 to 31-1-11, F.C.A. 1953, (State Depository 
.\et). 
It is submitted that the Treasurer's constitutional 
duty as the "custoflian of public moneys" does not in-
rnl\·p the powers of managing, investing, reinvesting 
altd (kpositi11g the moneys of the state as claimed by ap-
pPlhrnt. Clearly the definition of "custody" indicates 
that the Treasurer has the immediate charge to keep and 
(-;t1·c1 for the pub lie moneys, subject to order and direction 
or· t lie· legislature, which has the absolute control. The 
duties and functions of the statutory officers set forth 
i11 <'haptL>r 206, Laws of Utah, 1969, do not conflict with 
t ];(· eu-;todial powers of the Treasurer, aforementioned; 
<rnrl the statute thus does not conflict with the Utah 
( \n1stitution. 
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P< nxre 11 
THE OFFICES BY CHAP-
TER 206, LA \VS UTAH, 19GD, AND THE 
FUN"CTIOKS THEREOF DO NOT VIOLA'l1E 
THE UTAH CONSTI'l'rTION. 
Plaintiff-appellant claims Chapkr 20G, Laws of 
Utah, 1969, to be unconstitutional because it 
for the creation of an investment council; an inwst-
ment officer; a financial analyst; and the creation of 
an investment division within the office of the Statp 
Treasurer. Certain Utah Constitutional provisions an• 
l·itecl for support of this cu11t0lltion, namely: Artiele V, 
Section 1, which deals with the respectin departments of 
go,·ernment; Article VII, S0ction 1, which enumerates 
the offices in the executive department; Article VII, 
Section 10, which sets forth the appointive powers vested 
in the Governor; and Article VII, Section 17, \d1ich states 
that the Treasurer shall be the custodian of publi(' 
moneys. The argument is that these provisions preclude 
the Legislature from either directly making appoint-
ments of deputies or other personnel within the offiee of 
the Treasurer, or empow<:'ring the Governor or any 
other executi,·e officer to make such appointments. 
This conclusion advanced is defective, for the Utah 
Constitution grants no power of appointment to the 
Treasurer, arnl 1wovicles for no constitutional officer 
under the control of the Treasurer. The office of the 
deputy treasurer is a creation of statute; the authority 
for the Treasurer to appoint a deputy is statutory. Sec-
tion G/-9-1, U.C'.A. 1!););). deficient an· the 
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;1nd autlioritil's t·itPd tl1P Tn•nsnrer, whi('h tell us 
..;11nw int(•resting things about various mattt'rs, hnt which 
;1n· i11appli(·al>ll' to th<' issm•s of tlH• instant <·ast'. 
Iu the ease of Ricks i:. Department of State Civil 
,...,·1·n-i('I· (La.) 8 So. :2d .HJ, it is stated: 
"\\'p ha1·t· lH•<•n 1111al:l1· to find an\· d(•<'ision of 
this eonrt passing on the qlwstion of whether or 
1101 a t·o11stitutiu11al ot't'i<·t·r has a eo11:-;titntio11al 
right to Relect his employpes. However, it has 
lir>t•11 h<•ld in otlH·r statt>s tlrnt stnt<• offi<·<•rs haYP 
no such constitutional right. The theory upon 
which tlwse decisions an• hased is to the> l'ffrct 
that the duties of an officer an• those imposc>d by 
law, and the employees who assist him are not 
his <•mplo:n•es, hut tlw c>mployees of the state>. 
'l1he employec>s are in public service and not 
prin1k s<'n·ice, and tlw state, aud not thP officer, 
Prnploys them and pays them. In otlwr words, the 
offieC'r does not have the vesterl or private per-
:-;011al right to select his suhor<linatl's. PeoplP v . 
.\leCnllough, 23-! Ill. 9, 98 N.E. 156, Ann. Cas. 
1913B, 905; People v. Loeffler, 175 Ill. 585, 51 
N.E. 785; People v. Capp, 61 Colo. 296, 158 P. 143; 
St<J\\<' , .. 13;) Or. :111, 2% P. 8G7.'' 
People u. Capp (Colo.) 158 P.143, the ques-
: iqn of ,,·hdlwr the Colorado civil :-;prvicP law re:-;trietl>d 
1 JI(• ('(1JJ...;titutional appointive power;; of thl' gon•rnor ii1-
<1srntwh as tlw law in question eontt•mplakd th(' cPrtifi-
,·,ition of an C'ligiblc• arnl 1n·osrH:di\·e t•mployc•l' hy the 
,.;,·ii s(•n·iet• eommis:-;io11. In ans\\·erillg the assl'rtion that 
111 L' d i:-;l'rl'tion of the go\·crnor in making a ppoi 11tm('11t s 
\\';1:-: takc·11 a\\·ay, and he was thus deprin·d of his po\n·r 
111 jl('!'t'()1·m eo11stitutio11al duties, the court stated: 
"This prnpositio11 is sournl when appli0d to 
C'011stitutio11al officers, hut in this ease counspl 
fallen into error in their conclusion hccans(' 
they have failed to Llistinguish betwec>n officer, 
proYided by the constitution and officers create;! 
by statute. There is no provision in the constitu-
tion giving the governor power to appoint the 
warden of the reformatory, or that requires the 
legislature to confer upon the governor the power 
to appoint that officer. The legislature was there-
fore free to confer that power upon some other 
official or board, as it might see fit, and because 
it originally conferred the power upon the govern-
or is no reason why that body may not either 
qualify that po1Yer, or if so disposed, take it away 
entirely. Had the constitution created the office o.f 
warden, or had it provided that the governor 
should appoint the warden when the legislature 
created the office, it may be conceded that then 
the governor's discretion could not be interfered 
with by the legislature. Hence it is plain that the 
statutory provision here assailed in no sense co11-
tra1-enes the constitutional provision in question." 
Stowe v. Ryan (Oregon) 296 P. 857, involved the 
right of the civil service commission to terminate a depu-
ty county elerk, under the Oregon law which authorized 
such action, and whether the law violated the state con-
stitution. The court held: 
''The petitioner discusses at great length the 
right of the commission to interfere \Yi th the 
countv cle>rk 's office bv removing or appointing 
a dc>p.uty county elerk.' Thc> office of the county 
clerk is a constitutional office; but that of deputy 
countv clerk is strictlv statutorv. If the appointing 
pO'.Ye; were expressly given to 'the county by 
tlw Constitution, then in such case the commission 
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\rn1ild lia\·1· 110 right to appoint or dis('harg-e tht' 
dP}lllty dnk." 
It ii' thus appan'nt that tht' lPgislature may create 
11ffi('<'" awl J)]'o\·ide for tlH·ir mannc>r of appointment, 
rc·11:1n>, a11d otht>r ineidc>ntl', md(•ss othPrwise restriete(l 
\,,. tl11· ('()J1stitutio11, and in thP instant <·asp 110 sud1 rc>-
"; r:1i1it ii' indil'ated. The T-tah ( 'onstitution <lops not pro-
rnl·· for tltl' offict·s iu q1wstiun, nor grant authority for 
1 !1(· Tn•;1:-;un'r to appoint to such offi('PS. ThNPfore, it 
is snhmittecl that the offict>s and orgauizational struc-
tnn· sd forth in Chapter 20G, La\YS of Ptah, Hl69, do not 
\'Ollt nn-P11e the Constitution of Utah; and it is further 
submit kd that the duties incident to these statutory 
offi<-es do not confliet with the Treasurer's constitutional 
as custodian of the public moneys. (SeP Point I) 
POINT III 
TO FNCONSTirrUTIONAL, A STAT-
.\ll1ST CLEARLY VIOLATE A SPECI-
FIC < 'OXSTITUTTOXAL PROVISION AND 
THE VIOLATION .JIUST 
t 'LETI•:, AXD XO srcu 
\-IOL1\TIOX TS 
it is fundamental that the k'gislativP hody of thr 
-,;iltt• has absolute C'Olltrol UYN its final!Cl'S. l'uless 
lirnitl·d hY constitutional provisions, tlw power of the 
"1<11t> legislature is r1lP1tary a11d it may direct a11d eo11-
1 rnl t lit· disposition of all statt• funds. Sec 81 ( ' .. J.S., 
:-.;Lltl'...,, pag<>s 114:>-1146. As has lwcn stated in th<> ease 
t•f Siaf,, r . .llaso11, 94 Vtah 501, 78 P.2<l 920: 
''The Legislature has p\·pry power which has 
11ot llet'll fully gn111kd to the F(•deral Gon'rnmt•nt 
or \\·hieh is not prohihitPd hy State ( '011stitutio11." 
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Similarly in Lehi City 1·. MeiliJ1.rJ, 87 Utah 237, 48 
P.2d 530, the court held: 
"It is a truii-;m recognizc><l by all the authori-
ties that the Legislature of a state is vested with 
the whole of the legislative pO"wer of the state and 
may deal in any subject within the scope of the 
constitutional go,-ernment except as such power 
is limited or directed by express provision of the 
Constitution or necessary implication arising 
therefrom. ''State Constitutions are mere 
tions, and not grants, of po"-ers.'' Salt Lake Citv 
v. Christensen Co., 34 Utah, 38, 95 P. 523, 1'7 
L.R.A. (N.S.) 898." 
It is submitted that the power of the legislature 
over the appropriation and expenditure of public funds 
includes as an incident thereof the power over the 
management, investment, and deposit of such funds. 
Attack having been made on the validity of Chapter 
206, Laws of Utah, 1969, any analysis of the assertions 
of unconstitutionality can only be pursuant to the guide 
lines heretofore set forth hy this Court. Thus in the 
Lehi City case, supra, it was stated: 
"In approarhing the subject we have in mind 
the rule that "·hen an act of the Legislature is 
attacked 011 grounds of unconstitutionality the 
question presented is not whether it is possible to 
condemn the act, but whether it is possible to up-
hold it. 'l'he presumption is always in favor of 
validity, and legislative enactments must be sus-
tained unless clearly in violation of fundamental 
law. vVadsworth v. ·Santaquin City, 83 Utah, 321, 
28 P.(2<1) 161. Every presumption will be indulged 
in fa,·or of legislation and only clear and demon-
strable usurpation of pmYer will authorize judicial 
12 
interference with legislative action. Green v. 
Frazier, 25:3 U.S. 2:33, 40 S. Ct. 499, 64 L. Ed. 878." 
The test of determining whether a statute is invalid 
has heeu delineated also in several other Utah decisions, 
imluding Trade Commission of Utah i·. Skaggs Drug 
Cc11ters, Tue., et al, 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2cl 958, wherein 
it was held: 
''An alleged violation of the Constitution 
mnst he of a specific provision of a particular 
article thereof. \Ve have repeatedly held in order 
to be dPclared unconstitutional, the statute must 
clearly violate some constitutional provision, and 
further, the violation must be clear, complete and 
unmistakable." 
See also Gubler et al. i-. Utah State Teacher's Retire-
111rnt Board et al, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580; Snow v. 
K cddi11gton, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d 234. 
The claim of the plaintiff-appellant that Chapter 
:206, Laws of Utah, 1969, is unconstitutional, hardly is 
supported hy a showing of any violation which is clear, 
(·om1Jlete, and unmistakable. To the contrary, the legis-
lation is clearly compatible with the provisions of the 
1· tah Constitution. 
\Ve adopt in argument the comments of the learned 
.Tu(lµ;e of the lower court, who in referring to the Utah 
( 'onstitution and the issues invoh·ed in this case, con-
1·i, 11Jed in part: 
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"Under Article VII, Section 3, the only re-
quirements for one to qualify as State Treasurer 
are that he be a qualified elector and a resident 
citizen of the state for five years next preceding 
his election. It also provides that the State Treas-
urer shall be ineligible to election as his own suc-
cessor. 
Mr. Allen may well be the most competent of 
State Treasurers, but to support his position in 
this case it would require the court to hold that 
as ''custodian of public moneys,'' he, and he 
alone, has complete and exclusive control over the 
investment and management of funds of the state 
and all of its political subdivisions to the exclu-
sion of other public officials and the state legis-
lature, and this even though any State Treasurer 
elected to the office may have absolutely no train-
ing, ability or experience in the investment and 
management of monetary funds and only four 
years to learn before he must leave office and 
make way for another State Treasurer. I cannot, 
in good conscience or judgment, believe that in 
using the phrase ''custodian of public moneys,'' 
the framers of the constitution intended that the 
State Treasurer should have such exclusive pow-
ers so as to deprive the legislature of any power 
to legislate with respect to the wise investment 
and handling of millions upon millions of dollars 
in public moneys. Certainly, the meaning of the 
term ''custodian'' is not so clear and convincing 
as to impress this writer that S.B. 205 or any of 
its provisions, is clearly, completely and unmis-
takably unconstitutional." (R. 77-78) 
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CONCLUSION 
Defandants-respondents submit that the l\Ioney Man-
agement Ad, Chapter 206, Laws of Utah, 1969, is con-
stitutional and that the decision and declaration of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Raymond W. Gee 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
400 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
15 
